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This paper uses a panel probit model with simultaneous equations to explain the joint 
determination of de facto and de jure exchange rate regimes in developing countries 
since 1980. We also derive an ordered-choice panel probit model to explain the causes 
of discrepancies between the two regime choices. Both models are estimated using 
simulation-based maximum likelihood methods. The results of the simultaneous 
equations model suggest that the two regime choices are dependent of each other and 
exhibit considerable state dependence. The ordered probit model provides evidence 
that regime discrepancies reflect an error-correction mechanism, and the discrepancies 
are persistent over time.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
  Up until the late 1990s, most studies on the choice of exchange rate regimes 
have focused on the de jure regimes declared by the governments.
1 De facto exchange 
rate regimes, which are identified mainly based on the observed behavior of exchange 
rates, started to attract attentions from researchers after several studies documented 
the wide difference between the exchange arrangements that countries claim to have 
and the exchange rate policies that they actually conduct. For example, Ghosh et al. 
(1997) point out that many countries declare currency pegs as their official exchange 
rate regimes, but allow frequent and sometimes substantial adjustments of their 
exchange rates. Their exchange arrangements are therefore observationally equivalent 
to floating regimes. In contrast, as documented by Calvo and Reinhart (2000), many 
countries claiming to have floating regimes have so tightly managed their exchange 
rates that these rates mimic the behavior of a fixed-rate regime. All these studies lead 
to one and the same conclusion: de facto exchange rate regimes are different from de 
jure ones, and the discrepancies between the two are not uncommon. 
  Empirical analysis of de facto exchange rate regimes have been hindered by the 
lack of convincing data on de facto regimes classified using widely accepted criteria. 
Even now the debate over the appropriate classification of de facto regimes is still 
unsolved. At the very least, however, some data series on de facto exchange rate 
regimes are now available for a wide range of countries over a few decades. The most 
prominent among them are the classifications made by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2000) and by Reinhart and Rogoff (2002). These data can be used to analyze the 
determination and evolution of de facto exchange rate regimes. 
  This paper is aimed at providing an empirical analysis of de facto exchange rate 
regimes in developing countries since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system.
2 We 
relate the choice of de facto regimes to that of de jure ones, since these two decisions 
are likely to influence each other. This possibility is captured by a simultaneous 
equations model, which explicitly allows for the structural interdependence between 
the two regime choices. We also directly address the issue of regime discrepancies by 
estimating an ordered probit model, which relates the observed discrepancies between 
de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes to a set of macroeconomic variables. To 
reflect the panel nature of the data, we allow random effects as well as lagged 
endogenous variables to explain state dependence in the regime choices.  
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
classification of de facto and de jure exchange rate regimes and provides a 
comparison between de facto and de jure regimes. Section 3 develops and estimates a 
simultaneous equations model to explain the joint determination of de facto and de 
jure regimes. In section 4 we derive and estimate an ordered probit model for the 
determination of various types of regime discrepancies. Some conclusions are 
presented in section 5. 
 
 
2.  Exchange Rate Regimes: Classification and Comparisons 
                                                
1 One early exception is Holden et al. (1979), who constructed an empirical index to measure de facto 
exchange-rate flexibility and regressed it on a set of regime determinants. Later studies involving de 
facto exchange rate regimes include, among others, Poirson (2001), Hausmann et al. (2000), and von 
Hagen and Zhou (2002b). 
2 Von Hagen and Zhou (2004) provide an empirical analysis of the determination of de jure exchange 
rate regimes in developing countries since the late 1970s.   3 
 
2.1  Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes 
  The first step for an analysis of exchange rate regime choices is an appropriate 
classification of these regimes. Because of widely-observed deviations of actual 
exchange rate policies from official exchange rate arrangements, we need to classify 
exchange rate regimes from two perspectives: one based on observed behavior of the 
exchange rate (probably complemented by the movements of other relevant variables 
such as foreign exchange reserves), which results in a classification of de facto 
exchange rate regimes, another based on official announcement as to the exchange 
arrangements in force, which leads to a classification of de jure exchange rate regimes. 
 
2.1.1 De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes 
  De facto exchange rate regimes are classified based mainly on the movements 
of exchange rates. Due to differences in the construction and interpretation of data on 
exchange rate movements, the classification of de facto exchange rate regimes may 
also be different across various approaches. To check the robustness of our empirical 
results, we will use two data sets on de facto exchange rate regimes in this paper. 
  One such classification is made by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000), 
henceforth “LYS”. These authors apply a cluster analysis to a data set with three 
volatility measures: volatility of the exchange rate, volatility of the change of the 
exchange rate, and volatility of international reserves. They classify de facto regimes 
in 172 countries during the period 1974—2000 according to the following principle. 
Fixed-rate regimes should have low volatility of the exchange rate and of the change 
of the exchange rate but high volatility of international reserves, as countries use 
reserve assets to intervene in the foreign exchange market and to stabilize the 
exchange rate. Floating-rate regimes, in contrast, should be characterized by high 
volatility in the exchange rate and in its rate of change but low volatility of foreign 
exchange reserves, since the exchange rate is allowed to fluctuate freely, and 
interventions, which may cause high volatility in international reserves, should be 
much less frequent. Lying somewhere between these two corners, intermediate 
regimes, which cover crawling pegs or bands and tightly managed floating rates 
(“dirty floats”), should have medium level of volatility of the exchange rate, low 
volatility of the change of the exchange rate, and medium to high volatility of reserve 
assets. In the application of the cluster analysis, the authors also identify a small group 
with low volatility of all the three dimensions. They label it “inconclusive” regimes, 
as the actual policy intention of the authority is difficult to infer when the foreign 
exchange market is tranquil. For our analysis, however, we will merge these 
inconclusive regimes with fixed ones, because they at least share a common feature of 
stable exchange rates (see Table 1, the upper panel).  
 
[  Table 1  ] 
 
  Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) argue that de facto regime classifications based on 
official exchange rates only, such as the LYS classification, can be misleading when 
market exchange rates exist on the parallel market. They therefore develop a “natural 
classification” of de facto regimes based on market-determined parallel exchange 
rates, and official rates are used only if the exchange rates are unified. We will refer to 
it as the “RR” classification. The authors examine the chronologies of 153 countries’ 
conduct of exchange rate policies for a period at the longest from 1946 to 2001. By 
combining official announcements, inflation performances, and volatility of exchange   4 
rate movements, they are able to distinguish among 15 de facto exchange rate regimes, 
ranging from regimes with no separate legal tender (such as full dollarization or 
currency union) to freely floating or falling rates or hyperfloating regimes. In the 
upper middle panel of Table 1, we list the RR classification with its 15 regime 
categories. They are grouped into three broader regimes: the first four categories from 
“no separate legal tender” to “de facto peg” are reclassified as fixed regimes, the next 
seven from “pre-announced crawling peg” to “moving band” as intermediate regimes, 
and the last four from “managed floating” to “hyperfloating” as flexible regimes.    
 
2.1.2 De Jure Exchange Rate Regimes 
  Official exchange rate regimes refer to those announced by the government and 
reported to the IMF. The IMF classifies these regimes and publishes the classification 
results in its publications, especially in Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements 
and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). As summarized by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2002), the IMF’s classification scheme has evolved from a very rough peg-or-not 
dichotomy in the 1970s  and the early 1980s, to a four-regime classification in the 
1980s and most of the 1990s, and finally to an eight-regime scheme since 1998. The 
most important difference between the pre-1998 and the post-1998 classifications is 
that the latter, at least claimed by the IMF, pays more attention to de facto exchange 
rate policies and gives a more accurate classification of actual exchange rate regimes. 
It can be argued, however, that the new IMF classification system is still one of de 
jure regimes, since it still relies heavily on official information and looks mainly the 
behavior of the official exchange rates.
3 
  The IMF regime classification is also listed in Table 1. In the lower middle 
panel, we list the old IMF classification for the period from early 1970s up to 1997. It 
should be noted that before 1983, the IMF had adopted a virtually dichotomous 
scheme to classify regimes as either maintaining exchange rates within narrow 
margins or not maintaining such margins, but sub-categories can be identified within 
each broad regime. From 1983 onwards, regimes with limited flexibility and more 
flexible arrangements joined pegged regimes and independently floating to form a 
four-category classification scheme. Here we list all the eight (sub-)categories ever 
used by the IMF during this period, and regroup them into three broad regimes: fixed 
regimes contain single currency pegs or composite currency pegs; intermediate 
regimes cover those with limited flexibility and those with rule-based exchange-rate 
adjustments; flexible regimes consist of not rule-based managed floating and 
independently floating. 
  The new IMF classification scheme for the post-1998 era is listed in the bottom 
panel of Table 1. To construct a three-regime classification, the eight regime 
alternatives are grouped in the following way: the first three, from currency unions to 
currency boards to conventional fixed pegs, form a broadly-defined “fixed” regime; 
the middle three—horizontal band, crawling peg, and crawling band—make the 
intermediate regime; the last two—managed floating and independently floating—
form the flexible regime.
4  
                                                
3 See von Hagen and Zhou (2002a, 2002b) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2002). 
4 Ghosh et al (1997) point out that many countries classified by the IMF as maintaining pegged regimes 
have frequently adjusted their exchange rate parities, while Calvo and Reinhart (2000) argue that many 
officially declared floating regimes are actually intervening their exchange rates to ensure their strong 
stability. These evidences suggest that the classification of some regimes is certainly subject to 
controversy. But this is why a separate de facto classification is necessary and important. Therefore, we   5 
 
2.2  De facto and De jure Exchange Rate Regimes: A Comparison 
  In this sub-section, we compare the IMF classification of de jure exchange rate 
regimes with both the LYS and the RR classification of de facto exchange rate 
regimes. We restrict our comparison to 112 developing countries during the period 
1978—2000, with a total of 1805 country-year data points, where observations on all 
the three regime classifications are available.  
 
2.2.1 Regime Discrepancies 
If we compare the degrees of flexibility of de facto and de jure regimes for a 
country in a particular year, the result can only be one of the following three 
alternatives: (1) the de facto regime is less flexible than the de jure one; (2) both 
regimes are of the same degree of flexibility; or (3) the de facto regime is more 
flexible than the de jure one. A typical case of the first scenario is a country declaring 
a floating regime but keeping the exchange rate very stable, a phenomenon what 
Calvo and Reinhart (2000) dubbed “fear of floating”. In our analysis, we will interpret 
this phrase more loosely to cover all the combinations where de facto regimes appear 
to be less flexible than the de jure ones, e.g. a combination of a de facto fixed regime 
with a de jure intermediate one. Conversely, the third scenario is called “fear of 
pegging” in this paper, since a good example of this scenario is a country declaring a 
fixed peg, but adjusting the parity so frequently that it is almost impossible to 
distinguish itself from a truly floating system.
5 Again, the label should be flexibly 
interpreted to cover all possible regime combinations falling in the third group.  
  The upper panel of Table 2 presents a cross-classification of exchange rate 
regimes. It reports the distribution of various de facto regimes given that a certain type 
of de jure regime is observed. On an aggregate level, the IMF classification suggests 
that fixed regimes are the predominant one, accounting for 54% of all observations, 
flexible regimes, with a share of 39.2%, rank the second, and intermediate regimes are 
the smallest group, having only 6.8% of the total observations. For de facto regimes, 
however, intermediate regimes have a slightly higher share than flexible ones (21.3% 
versus 20.1% based on the LYS data, or 31.5% versus 28.5% based on the RR data). 
The share of fixed regimes in the LYS data (58.6%) is even higher than in the IMF 
data, but it drops to 40% when the RR classification is used. In both de facto 
classifications, intermediate regimes gain position at the cost of flexible regimes, 
suggesting that the fear-of-floating phenomenon is recognized when de facto regimes 
are classified, but the phenomenon of fear of pegging seems to have been given less 
attention by the LYS approach than by the RR scheme. 
 
          [  Table 2  ] 
 
  Based on the more detailed cross-classification of de jure and de facto regimes, 
we can test whether these two regime classifications are independently distributed of 
                                                                                                                                       
stick to the notional classification made by the IMF in order to highlight the discrepancies between de 
jure and de facto classifications. 
5 Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000) use the phrase “fear of pegging” to denote cases where 
countries are afraid of announcing de jure fixed regimes and prefer to declare more flexible regimes, 
although they maintain stable exchange rates on a de facto basis. In our terminology, these are the cases 
of the first scenario, i.e., de facto regimes are less flexible than the official regimes. In this paper, as 
like in von Hagen and Zhou (2002b), we reserve the term “fear of pegging” for the cases where de 
facto regimes are more flexible than de jure counterparts.   6 
each other. For both the IMF-LYS and the IMF-RR comparisons, the null hypothesis 
of independence is rejected due to highly significant chi-squared statistics (122.36 for 
the former and 107.68 for the latter). Therefore, the distributions of de jure and de 
facto regimes seem to be correlated with each other, and the choices for one regime 
can influence that of another and vice versa. 
  The lower panel of Table 2 reports the numbers and shares of cases of the 
above-mentioned three scenarios when the flexibility of a de facto regime is compared 
with that of a de jure one. It is derived from the upper panel of Table 2. Regime 
combinations on the diagonal have the property that the two regimes have the same 
degree of flexibility (“regime consistency”), those above the diagonal have a de facto 
regime more flexible than the de jure one (“fear of pegging”), and those below the 
diagonal have a de facto regime less flexible than the de jure one (“fear of floating”). 
Using the LYS data, more than 64% of all cases show regime consistency, 26% of 
them exhibit fear of floating, and nearly 10% of cases have fear of pegging. Based on 
the RR data, the prevalence of regime consistency is reduced, with its share now 
below 56%. The share of fear of floating decreases slightly to 23.7%, but that of fear 
of pegging increases significantly to 20.4%. This again points to the possibility that 
the issue of fear of pegging might be less adequately addressed by the LYS approach 
than by the RR classification.
6 
 
2.2.2 Regime Persistence and Transition 
  From a dynamic point of view, current exchange rate regime choices, de jure or 
de facto, can be dependent on past regime choices. In other words, there can be state 
dependence in regime choices. If past regime choices have strong positive influence 
on the possibility for the same regime being chosen in the current period, we should 
observe strong regime persistence in the data. One way to measure the degree of 
regime persistence is to calculate the conditional probability for each regime being 
adopted in the current year given that the same regime has been adopted in the last 
year.
7 The upper panel of Table 3 presents our estimation for the IMF, LYS, and RR 
classifications. According to the IMF data, there are 941 observations where a fixed 
regime is maintained for the second year, accounting for 94% of all the cases where a 
fixed regime was adopted in the last year. In other words, only 6% of last-year’s pegs 
exit from such pegs in this year. In contrast, the persistence of intermediate regimes is 
about 82%, with more than 18% of last-year’s intermediate regimes switch to other 
regimes. The persistence of flexible regime is comparable to that of fixed ones, with a 
conditional probability for continuation at 92.4% and, therefore, an exit rate of 7.6%. 
On average, de jure regimes have a persistence of roughly 93%. 
  Persistence of de facto regimes based on the LYS classification is much lower 
than that of the IMF de jure classification, both on average and for each individual 
regime. The conditional probability for regime continuation is 85.6% for fixed 
regimes, 46.9% for intermediate regimes, and 58.0% for flexible regimes. Average 
                                                
6 This can be traced back to the difference in the exchange rate data used for the two classifications. 
The RR approach uses market exchange rates when available, while the LYS approach uses official 
exchange rates. If a country declares a fixed regime and maintains a stable official exchange rate, while 
the market exchange rate fluctuates freely, such a case will be identified as a fixed regime by LYS but a 
flexible one by RR. This results in a case of regime consistency based on LYS, but a case of fear of 
pegging based on RR. Not surprisingly, we will have more cases of regime consistency and less cases 
of fear of pegging with the LYS data than with the RR data. 
7 Masson (2001) assumes that regime transitions follow a first-order Markov process and estimates the 
transition matrix with three states: fixed, intermediate, and flexible regimes. Our measure of regime 
persistence corresponds to the diagonal elements of such a transition matrix.   7 
regime persistence is roughly 72% with LYS data. In contrast, the RR data shows that 
de facto regimes have similar degree of persistence as compared with de jure regimes. 
Only intermediate regimes exhibit some difference, with the persistence of de facto 
regimes about 10 percentage points higher than that of de jure ones. On average, 
however, persistence of de facto regimes based on the RR data is almost the same as 
that based on the IMF classification.  
 
          [  Table 3  ] 
 
  A direct result of this difference in regime persistence between the two de facto 
classifications is that, when combined with de jure regimes, the de-jure-de-facto 
regime discrepancies may also exhibit different degree of persistence between the two 
de facto classifications. Here we again use conditional probabilities to measure 
persistence of regime gaps. Because the RR and the IMF classifications are similarly 
persistent, any gaps (including no gaps in case of regime consistency) between these 
two should also be highly persistent. It is shown in the lower panel of Table 3 that the 
IMF-RR discrepancies has a degree of persistence of 84.0% for fear of pegging, 
87.5% for fear of floating, and 91.8% for regime consistency. In other words, more 
than 80% of regime gaps observed in the last year will continue in this year, while 
more than 90% of consistent regime combinations will still be maintained in this year. 
In contrast, due to lower persistence of the LYS de facto regimes, the IMF-LYS 
discrepancies are less persistent than the IMF-RR discrepancies. The average degree 
of persistence of the IMF-LYS regime discrepancies is 76.4%, and it is 53.3% for fear 
of pegging, or 68.7% for fear of floating. It suggests that, because the LYS 
classification identifies more regime changes than the RR classification does, the 
discrepancies between the IMF and the LYS classifications are more likely be 
eliminated than the IMF-RR discrepancies. 
 
          [  Table 4  ] 
 
  Another comparison between the dynamics of de jure and de facto regimes is to 
examine the association between changes of the two regimes. For each classification, 
the degree of flexibility of this year’s regime, when compared with that of last year’s 
regime, can be decreased, unchanged, or increased. Table 4 reports the cross-
classification of de jure and de facto regime changes. It lists the numbers and shares 
of various types of de facto regime changes for each type of de jure regime changes. 
All the three regime classifications show that cases of unchanged regime flexibility 
are the most dominant type, consistent with high degree of overall regime persistence 
discussed above. But when regime changes do take place, the association between de 
jure and de facto regime changes is weak. For example, when de jure regimes become 
less flexible, only 31.6% of cases are accompanied by reduction of flexibility of de 
facto regimes based on the LYS classification, and this share is merely 10.5% if the 
RR data is used. At the other extreme, when flexibility of de jure regimes increases, 
43.4% of cases are associated with increase in flexibility of the LYS de facto regimes, 
and 15.8% based on the RR classification. However, due to higher frequency of 
regime changes classified by LYS than by RR when de jure regimes are unchanged, 
the average degree of association of the IMF-LYS regime changes is 71.6%, lower 
than the IMF-RR association, which is estimated at 87.7% 
 
   8 
3.  A Simultaneous Equations Model for Joint Regime 
Determination 
   
We find in the previous section that de facto and de jure regime choices tend to 
be correlated with each other. It is reasonable to assume that de facto exchange rate 
policies are constrained by de jure exchange arrangements, while official exchange 
rate regime choices may formalize the practice in conducting exchange rate policies. 
A straightforward way of reflecting this assumption is to construct a simultaneous 
equations model for the joint determination of de facto and de jure regime choices.
8 
Because of the panel nature of our data, we include country-specific random effects 
for both regime choices, and estimated the model with simulation-based maximum 
likelihood methods.  
 
3.1  The Model 
  We use  it q  to denote the de facto exchange rate regime observed in country i in 
year t. It is a discrete variable that can take one of the three values: 0, 1, or 2. The 
realization of this random variable depends on whether a latent variable, denoted by 
*
it q , crosses some threshold. To be specific,  













regime.   flexible   facto   de 2 then , If
regime,   te intermedia   facto   de 1 then , 0   If







    (1) 
We can interpret 
*
it q  as an unobservable measure of the desired degree of regime 
flexibility, so higher values of this latent variable will typically result in more flexible 
regimes with higher values for  it q . Note that we normalize the lower threshold 
differentiating fixed and intermediate regimes to zero, while the positive threshold 
differentiating intermediate and flexible regimes is denoted by  q t . Analogously, de 
jure exchange rate regime in country i in year t is indicated by  it y , and the 
associated latent variable is denoted by 
*
it y . The mapping from 
*
it y  to  it y  is similar to 
the mapping for de facto regimes, that is, 
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    (2) 
We again normalize the lower threshold to zero, and denote the upper threshold by  y t . 
  We use a simultaneous equations model to describe the joint determination of 
the choices of de facto and de jure exchange rate regimes. The structural form of the 
model is as follows: 




i q it q
q
it it u e y q + + + =
* * a b x ,                (3a) 




i y it y
y
it it u e q y + + + =
* * a b x ,                (3b) 
                                                
8 Von Hagen and Zhou (2002b) use a bivariate probit model to analyze the joint determination of de 
facto and de jure exchange rate regime choices in transition economies. It can be shown that such a 
bivariate model can be derived as the reduced form of a simultaneous equations model allowing 
structural interactions between the two regime decisions. See Appendix I for details.     9 
where 
q
it x  (
y
it x ) is a row vector of determinants for the choice of de facto (de jure) 
exchange rate regime. The country-specific and time-invariant random effects in the 




i i e e e , which are assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) bivariate normal with zero mean and 
a variance-covariance matrix denoted by  e S : 
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The two error terms, 
q
it u  and 
y
it u , are assumed to be i.i.d. standard normal and are 
independent of each other, that is, 






















u 0 .        (4b) 
  This structural model has several features. Firstly, it explicitly models the 
endogeneity of de facto regime choices to those of de jure ones and vice versa. It is 
motivated by the conjecture that announced exchange arrangements may restrain the 
actual conduct of exchange rate policies, which in turn may affect the choice of such 
formal regime. Secondly, besides the linkage due to the above-mentioned simultaneity, 
the two decision problems can also be linked due to correlation between the two 
random-effect terms. These terms are included to control for all the omitted factors 
which might be important for the decision on regime choices. If these terms are 
correlated, then there is a possibility that both regime choices are driven by a third 
common factor. Embedding a variance-covariance structure such as equation (4) into 
the model may help us deal with this possibility. Thirdly, the existence of time-
invariant random effects may also contribute to the empirical persistence of both de 
facto and de jure regimes. Although for simplicity we assume that neither 
q
it u  nor 
y
it u  
is serially correlated, the composite error terms augmented by the random-effect terms 
will still be serially correlated. Such correlation may explain the state dependence in 
regime choices, a notion that current regime decision depend on past choices. As 
pointed out by Heckman (1981), however, this refers to the so-called “spurious” state 
dependence; the “true” state dependence should be directly caused by past regime 
choices, which can be incorporated into this model by including dummies for past 
regime choices in the explanatory variables. 
  The model can be estimated using a two-stage approach (Heckman, 1978; 
Maddala, 1983). Here we only sketch the estimation procedures, with all the details 
collected in Appendix I. In the first stage, we estimate the reduced-form equations for 
*
it q  and 
*
it y  and compute their fitted values as instruments. Note that both error terms 
of the reduced-form equations are composites of the structural disturbances 
q
it u  and 
y
it u  and are therefore correlated with each other. A bivariate probit model exploits this 
correlation and generally leads to more efficient estimation of the reduced-form model. 
In the second stage, we replace the endogenous variables appearing on the right-hand 
side of the structural equations by their respective instruments, and the structural 
parameters can be identified accordingly. In both stages we need to first formulate the 
conditional probabilities conditioned on, besides the explanatory variables 
q
it x  and
y
it x , 
the random-effect terms, and then approximate the unconditioned probabilities (that is, 
conditioned only on the explanatory variables) by their simulated means. These 
simulated probabilities will be plugged into the likelihood function for maximization.   10 
 
3.2  Explanatory Variables 
3.2.1 Determinants of De facto Exchange Rate Regimes 
What are the empirical determinants of the choice of a de facto exchange rate 
regime? In an empirical analysis of the causes of fear of floating, Hausmann et al. 
(2000) relate this phenomenon to different levels of exchange–rate pass-through and 
differences in countries’ ability to avoid currency mismatches in their international 
liability. If the pass-through from exchange rate adjustments to domestic prices is 
perfect, then the adjustment of the nominal exchange rate cannot produce the desired 
adjustment of the real exchange rate, which is necessary for exchange rate movements 
to have any real effects on aggregate demand. In this case, exchange rate movements, 
and de facto flexible exchange rate regimes that actually facilitate such adjustments, 
are of little use, so the exchange rates may well be stable in reality, resulting in de 
facto fixed regimes being observed. On the contrary, if a country is able to borrow in 
its own currency in the international financial market, currency mismatch of its 
international liability is largely eliminated. Then devaluations of the home currency, 
when necessary, will not have severe negative balance-sheet effects on the domestic 
economy. As a result, the country is more likely to allow its exchange rate to float 
freely, and fear of floating becomes less relevant.  
  In a study of de facto exchange rate regimes in transition economies, von Hagen 
and Zhou (2002b) argue that determinants of de jure exchange rate regime choices can 
also be determinants of de facto regime choices. However, some macroeconomic 
developments may create policy dilemmas and cause discrepancies between de jure 
and de facto exchange rate regimes. For example, high inflation may call for exchange 
rate adjustments and, therefore, de facto flexibility of the exchange rate regime, before 
an unsustainable peg collapses in a crisis, although a case for de jure fixed regime as 
nominal anchor can be made. In a similar vein, a formal exchange rate peg may be 
used to strengthen fiscal discipline, but large budget deficits are typically associated 
with actual exchange rate flexibility, as currency pegs are increasingly vulnerable to 
attacks when the fiscal policy is viewed as irresponsible. Moreover, large current 
account deficits may require currency devaluations to help restore external 
competitiveness of domestic exports, but such devaluations may fuel into domestic 
inflation and may worsen the problems caused by currency mismatches. 
  In the empirical analysis presented below, we use the following variables as 
proxies for the potential regime determinants mentioned above. Details on the 
definition and construction of each variable as well as data sources are collected in 
Appendix II. The pass-through effect of exchange rate adjustment on domestic price 
stability is measured by the correlation coefficient between monthly consumer price 
inflation rates and monthly rate of depreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate 
lagged by one month (PASSTHRU), so a positive value indicates that exchange rate 
depreciation leads to a higher inflation rate one month later. We calculate this variable 
for each country in each year. The problem of currency mismatch is captured by gross 
capital flows (the sum of inflows and outflows) normalized by GDP (KFLOW). The 
idea is that the larger is the gross capital flows, the larger is the share of foreign-
currency denominated capital transactions, and therefore the severer is the currency 
mismatch problem. Inflation is measured by annual consumer price inflation rates 
(CPINF), but transformed using the formula  ) 1 /( p p + .
9 Fiscal deficits are measured 
                                                
9 We follow Ghosh et al. (1997) to apply this transformation to avoid the bias caused by some cases of 
very high inflation without deleing them from the sample.    11 
by central government budget balances normalized by GDP (FISCAL), with deficits 
(surpluses) denoted by negative (positive) values. Current account balances (CA) are 
also normalized by GDP, and with negative (positive) values denoting deficits 
(surpluses), too. 
 
3.2.2 Determinants of De jure Exchange Rate Regimes 
  Determinants of de jure exchange rate regimes can be divided into three main 
groups.
10 The first group contains those criteria suggested by the Optimum Currency 
Area (OCA) theory, including trade openness (OPENNESS, defined as the ratio of 
total trade to GDP), geographical concentration of foreign trade (GEOCON, measured 
by the share of trade with the largest trading partner in total trade), economic size 
(SIZE, measured by GDP), level of economic development (LEVEL, measured by per 
capita GDP), and financial sector development (FINDEV, proxied by the ratio of 
broad money—M2—to GDP). We expect that higher degree of trade openness and 
more geographically concentrated trade structure will make fixed regimes more 
preferable than flexible regimes, while larger economic size, higher level of economic 
development, and more advanced financial industry will make flexible regimes more 
likely to be adopted. 
The second group contains proxies for various types of shocks stressed by the 
optimal stabilization literature. This strand of literature emphasizes that fixed regimes 
should be preferable if nominal shocks are the predominant type of shocks impinge on 
the economy, while flexible regimes will be a better choice if real shocks are more 
influential. Nominal shocks are proxied by the average absolute deviation of the 
annual growth rate of broad money from its four-year backward moving average 
(NSHK). Real shocks are measured by the three-year centered standard deviation of 
the terms-of-trade growth rate (RSHK). 
The third group contains two variables measuring the risk of currency crises. 
The variable RESERVE is the ratio of non-gold international reserves to broad money, 
which is designed to reflect the sufficiency of international reserves when it is 
necessary to use reserves to stabilize the exchange rate. We expect that higher reserve 
stocks will improve the sustainability of fixed regimes and make them more feasible. 
The variable KCONTR is a measure of the intensity of capital controls, with higher 
values denoting more intensive capital controls. It is believed that maintaining capital 
controls can help protect fixed exchange rate regimes, while liberalization of capital 
account makes flexible regime more likely to be chosen if countries want to retain 
monetary autonomy to some extent.  
   
3.3  Empirical Results 
  We estimate our model with all the above-mentioned variables lagged by one 
year to attenuate possible endogeneity problem. We also include period dummies for 
every five-year periods starting in 1986, with the pre-1986 period as the benchmark. 
Both static and dynamic versions of the simultaneous equations model are estimated, 
each with both LYS and RR classifications of de facto exchange rate regimes. The 
results are presented in Table 5. 
 
3.3.1 The Static Model 
                                                
10 See von Hagen and Zhou (2004) for a review of empirical studies on the choice of (de jure) exchange 
rate regimes. The paper also briefly discusses the theoretical literature on the topic, which provides 
justifications for the various variables used in empirical studies as regime determinants.    12 
  The first two columns show the results of the static version of the simultaneous 
equations model, that is, without past regime choices included as determinants of the 
current regime choices. The first thing to note is that there is indeed simultaneity in 
the determination of de facto and de jure regime choices. The coefficients for the two 
endogenous variables, 
*
it y  and 
*
it q , are all significant and positive. Therefore, on the 
one hand, the intention to adopt a flexible de jure regime (i.e., 
*
it y  is high) will raise 
the desirability of a flexible de facto regime, and on the other hand, the decision to 
adopt a de facto fixed regime (i.e., 
*
it q  is low) will also reduce the attractiveness of 
flexible regimes as de jure exchange arrangements. This suggests that countries have 
actually a strong tendency to conduct their exchange rate policies in a way consistent 
with their declared official framework, and are willing to formally adopt regimes that 
best match their exchange rate policies. This is consistent with the fact that, despite of 
frequently observed regime discrepancies, consistent regime combinations are still far 
more common.  
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  The empirical relevance of the potential determinants for de facto regime 
choices discussed above appears to be rather weak if the LYS classification is used, 
but relatively strong if the RR classification is used. In both cases, however, all the 
variables bear expected signs, except for the CA variable. High inflation (CPINF) 
indeed leads to more flexible de facto regimes, as can be inferred from the positive 
coefficient. But if the pass-through effect from exchange rate fluctuations to domestic 
price instability is strong (high PASSTHRU), de facto regimes with higher degree of 
fixity are more likely to be adopted. Moreover, if a country is active in international 
capital transactions, especially if a country has large foreign-currency denominated 
liabilities (high KFLOW), de facto exchange rate stability is also more desirable. In 
contrast, large fiscal deficits (negative FISCAL) make a flexible de facto regime more 
likely to be adopted. All these are consistent with our expectations. But the CA 
variable has a positive coefficient, suggesting that, in case of large current account 
deficits (negative CA), de facto regimes tend to be less flexible. This probably reflects 
the reverse causality, i.e., rigid de facto exchange rate policies prevent current account 
deficits being eliminated by exchange rate adjustments.  
  For the determination of de jure regime choices, high degree of trade openness 
and of geographical concentration seem to make flexible exchange rate regimes more 
likely, which is against our expectations. One explanation is that countries may be 
concerned with their external competitiveness in the leading export market, and the 
more concerned, the more they trade with that partner. Therefore, flexible de jure 
regimes, which facilitate exchange rate adjustment in case of need, are more 
preferable than rigid fixed regimes. Economic size works in the expected direction. 
Larger economies are more likely to adopt flexible regimes than smaller ones, 
reflecting the reluctance of larger economies to give up their monetary autonomy 
required by the implementation of a fixed exchange rate regime. The level of 
development, both for the overall economy (LEVEL) and for the financial sector 
(FINDEV), bear negative and significant coefficients, so more advanced economies 
tend to have less flexible regimes. This is likely due to the fact that richer countries or 
those with more advanced financial industry are more able to sustain the monetary 
pressures when monetary policies are devoted to the stability of the exchange rate. 
The results with two shock variables (RSHK and NSHK) are not very impressive,   13 
probably because they are poor proxies for the underlying shocks. Reserve sufficiency, 
although insignificant, has the expected negative sign, indicating that availability of 
international reserves makes fixed regimes more feasible. The intensity of capital 
controls (KCONTR) is negatively associated with the degree of fixity of the exchange 
rate regimes, confirming the view that countries impose capital controls to help 
maintain fixed exchange rate regimes. 
  There are several interesting results that can be inferred from the estimated 
variance-covariance matrix of the country-specific random effects. Firstly, both  qq s  
and  yy s  are highly significant with the LYS classification, and almost so with the RR 
data.
11 Because the random effects are expected to capture the impacts of all the 
omitted factors that might influence regime choices, there seems to be significant 
variance in these factors. Secondly, both regime choices tend to be serially auto-
correlated due to the presence of these time-invariant country-specific random effects, 
resulting in some degree of state dependence in the regime choices. Thirdly, the 
random effects included in the two regime decision processes are significantly and 
positively correlated with each other, as can be seen from the positive and significant 
covariance term  qy s . This reinforces our earlier finding that, in the absence of other 
disturbances, the two regime choices tend to be consistent with each other. 
 
3.3.2 The Dynamic Model 
  In the third and fourth column of Table 5, we report empirical results for the 
dynamic version of the simultaneous equations model. The dynamic model is derived 
by augmenting the static one with dummies for regime choices in the previous year. 
LDFINTER is a dummy variable, taking a value of 1 if the de facto regime in the 
previous year is an intermediate one and 0 otherwise. LDFFLEX is similarly defined 
for past flexible regime choices. LDJINTER and LDJFLEX are the correspondent 
dummies for past de jure regime choices. Dummies for fixed regimes are excluded to 
avoid perfect multicollinearity.  
As can be seen from Table 5, all the dummies for past regime choices enter with 
significant coefficients, showing that “true” state dependence plays important role in 
the determination of both de facto and de jure exchange rate regime choices. And 
since these coefficients are all positive, it suggests that flexible regimes will be more 
likely to be adopted in this year if flexible regimes have been adopted in the last year, 
and the same is true for intermediate and fixed regimes, too. This is consistent with 
the strong regime persistence discussed in the previous section. 
When past regime choices are added to the model, however, some of the other 
variables lose significance and in some cases even the signs are reversed. This 
suggests that these variables might have captured to some extent in the static model 
the influence of past regime choices on the current decisions. Among the variables 
still with significant coefficients in the dynamic framework, fiscal deficits point to the 
direction of more flexible de facto regimes, while large exposures to foreign capital 
favor fixed de facto regimes. For the choice of de jure regimes, open economies still 
tend to choose more flexible ones, but small economies as well as those with 
advanced financial sectors prefer fixed regimes.  
The variance and covariance terms are again significant for both de facto regime 
classifications. Therefore, in addition to and despite of “true” state dependence 
captured by the significant roles of lagged regime dummies, there is also “spurious” 
                                                
11 The p-value for  qq s  with the RR data is 0.14.   14 
state dependence captured by the random-effect terms. Because of the addition of 
lagged regime dummies, however, some part of the variance of the omitted factors is 
now explained by these dummies, so the remaining unexplained variance becomes 
smaller. The variance and covariance terms are generally smaller under the dynamic 
specification than under the static one, which is consistent with this interpretation. 
Because of strong regime persistence on both de facto and de jure dimensions, 
and because of the direct inclusion of lagged regime dummies in regression, it is no 
surprise that the dynamic model performs better than the static one in terms of in-
sample predictions. Based on the LYS classification, the rate of correct predictions for 
de facto regime choices rises from 56% for the static model to 68% for the dynamic 
one, and the rate for de jure regimes rises from 63% to 91%. The rate of correct 
predictions on both regimes improves from 41% to 63%. An even more dramatic 
improvement in the ratio of correct predictions is achieved if the RR classification is 
used. In general, the static model performs better with the LYS data than with the RR 
data, but the ranking is reversed for the dynamic model. 
 
 
4.  An Ordered Probit Model for Regime Discrepancies 
   
The simultaneous equations model describes the joint determination of de facto 
and de jure exchange rate regimes and, therefore, the discrepancies between the two. 
An alternative approach is to relate the observed regime gaps directly to various 
factors that might be important causes of regime discrepancies. It is especially 
interesting to know, given the choice of a formal exchange rate regime, how these 
factors may lead to a deviation of actual exchange rate policies from the announced 
framework.
12 In this section we use an ordered probit model to explain the gaps 
between de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes. 
 
4.1  The Model 
  The model is closely related to the simultaneous equations model of the 
previous section. Let  it g  be the indicator of regime gaps observed in country i in year 
t. It takes a value of –1 if the de jure regime is less flexible than the de facto one (that 
is, a case of “fear of pegging” in a broader sense). In other words,  1 - = it g  if  it it q y < . 
If de jure regimes are more flexible than de facto ones (a case of loosely interpreted 
“fear of floating”),  it it q y > , and  1 + = it g . The remaining possibility is that de jure 
and de facto regimes are of the same degree of flexibility, i.e.  it it q y = . In this case we 
have  0 = it g .  
  Because the value of  it g  depends on the relative flexibility of the de facto 
regime as compared to that of de jure one, it is straightforward to relate  it g  to the 
difference in the desired degree of flexibility of the two regimes, namely, 
* * - it it q y . 
Define a latent variable 
* * * - º it it it q y g . Then the relation between 
*
it g  and  it g  is as 
follows: 
                                                
12 Due to the symmetry of the simultaneous equation model, it might be argued that regime gaps can 
also be examined with de facto policies as given conditions. However, we believe that this scenario is 
less likely the case in reality, since de facto policies can only be identified with time lags and probably 
based on sophisticated analysis of exchange rate movements, while information on de jure regimes is 
publicly announced and is easier and earlier to get.   15 
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  It can be shown that 
*
it g  is determined in the following way (for details see 
Appendix I): 
    it i it it u e g + + P =
* x ,                  (6) 
where  it x  contains all distinct variables from 
q
it x  and 
y
it x , P is the coefficients vector, 
i e  is the country-specific random effect, which is distributed i.i.d. N(





it it u u u ~ ~ - = , with 
y
it u ~  and 
q
it u ~  being the error terms of the reduced-form 
equation for de jure and de facto regime choices.  
  Although an ordered probit model based on (6) can be estimated, it is shown in 
Appendix I that a more efficient way is to use instead 




it i it it y u u y u e g r r - - + - + + P =
* x .    (7) 
We adopt this modification to reflect the fact that information on de jure regime 
choices becomes available earlier than that on de facto regimes, so the realization of 
regime gaps can be conditioned on the given choices of de jure arrangements. 
Moreover, Appendix I shows that  ) | ( E it it y u  depends on  ) | ~ ( E it
y
it y u , and that the 
latter is typically non-zero. Therefore, given de jure regimes, the error term in (6) 
generally does not have a zero mean, and a direct estimation of (6) becomes less 
efficient. This problem is solved in (7) by subtracting from  it u  its conditional mean 
) | ~ ( E ) 1 ( it
y
it y u r - . This conditional mean also has an economic interpretation: it is a 
measure of the “error” made in the choice of de jure regimes. For example, if it is 
positive and large, the adopted de jure regime tends to be overly flexible relative to its 
desired degree of flexibility captured by 
*
it y . This inappropriateness in the de jure 
regime choice is corrected to some extent when the de facto regime is less flexible, 
that is, when 
*
it g  is increasing in  ) | ~ ( E it
y
it y u , which is the case as long as  1 < r . 
Therefore, our model based on (7) has the potential to capture the error-correction 
mechanism in the deviation of de facto exchange rate policies from de jure exchange 
arrangements. 
 
4.2  Empirical Results 
  As with the simultaneous equations model, we estimate the ordered probit 
model with all the explanatory variables mentioned in section 3.2 lagged by one year. 
Constant terms and period dummies are also included. Given our model specification, 
a positive (negative) coefficient means that higher values of the variable in question 
makes de jure regimes more (less) flexible relative to de facto ones, so the probability 
of having fear of floating (fear of pegging) is increased.   
The first two columns of Table 6 report estimation results of the static model. 
The first thing to note is that our measure of the inappropriateness of the de jure 
regime choices,  ) | ~ ( E it
y
it y u , has indeed positive and significant coefficients, 
confirming our conjecture that regime gaps can be created in response to the errors in 
the choices of the official exchange rate regimes. In case of an overly flexible de jure 
regime,  ) | ~ ( E it
y
it y u  must be positive and large. Given its positive coefficient, it raises   16 
the value of 
*
it g , making fear of floating more likely, that is, the de facto regime tends 
to be less flexible than the de jure one. If an intermediate regime is desirable but the 
country chooses instead a fixed one as its formal exchange arrangement,  ) | ~ ( E it
y
it y u  
must be negative. This reduces the value of the latent variable associated with regime 
gaps, so fear of pegging can be expected, with de facto regimes more flexible than de 
jure one. All these suggest that, given de jure regime choices and given possible errors 
in these choices, de facto regimes are so selected that such errors can be corrected to 
some extent. 
 
          [  Table 6  ] 
 
  For many explanatory variables, their qualitative influences on regime gaps are 
the same no matter whether regime gaps are defined using the LYS or the RR 
classification. The significance levels of these variables are usually also the same 
across two de facto regime classifications. For example, countries more open to 
foreign trade, more heavily concentrated with one major trading partner, or with 
larger economic size, are more likely to exhibit fear of floating, as the coefficients for 
OPENNESS, GEOCON, and SIZE are positive and usually significant. While these 
variables tend to make de jure flexible regimes more likely, de facto regimes are not 
being pushed to the more flexible end, therefore resulting in positive regime gaps  it g . 
On the contrary, countries with higher per capita GDP, with more developed financial 
industry, with larger international reserves, or with more intensive capital controls 
tend to have fear of pegging, i.e., the regime gaps  it g  tend to be negative, since the 
coefficients for LEVEL, FINDEV, RESERVE, and KCONTR are negative and—
except for RESERVE—highly significant. These variables tend to be associated with 
more rigid de jure regimes, but the actual exchange rate policies are often more 
flexible than the formal frameworks. Strong pass-through of exchange-rate adjustment 
onto price movement makes fear of floating slightly more likely, as the choice of de 
facto regimes are likely to be fixed ones, but this effect is insignificant. The other 
variables have different signs across two de facto regime classifications, and while all 
the variables tend to create fear of floating based on the LYS data (all the coefficients 
are positive), they lead to fear of pegging when the RR classification is used (with 
negative coefficients).  
  The remaining two columns of Table 6 report estimation results of the dynamic 
model, where dummies for lagged regime gaps are included in the regression. Here 
LAGFP is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if fear of pegging is observed in the 
previous year and zero otherwise, and LAGFF is similarly defined for the case of fear 
of floating.
13 These two dummies have significant impacts on the current scenario of 
regime gaps, with fear of pegging (or fear of floating) more likely in this year if such 
a phenomenon was already there in the last year than otherwise. This is consistent 
with our previous finding that regime gaps tend to be persistent, even after controlling 
for the possibility that observed gap persistence might be caused by the presence of 
time-invariant country-specific random effects, which tend to make the error terms of 
                                                
13 If we had derived the dynamic model for regime gaps strictly from the dynamic version of the 
simultaneous equations model, we would have four dummies for lagged de jure and de facto regime 
choices included in the model. In actual estimations we modify the model slightly to replace the four 
regime dummies with two gap dummies, so that we can more directly address the issue of gap 
persistence.    17 
the regression serially correlated. This conclusion holds irrespective of the de facto 
classification used.  
  The qualitative impacts of the other explanatory variables on regime gaps are 
generally the same as in the static model, although the level of significance has 
dropped for many variables. This is again due to the fact that, in the static model, 
these variables have captured the impacts of past regime gaps, which are now 
reflected by the relevant dummies. Not surprisingly, the estimated standard deviation 
of the random effects ( e s ) is now smaller in the dynamic model than in the static one, 
and for the RR classification, it is even statistically not different from zero. As the 
dynamic model can explain more than 92% of the IMF-RR regime gaps, but only 77% 
of the IMF-LYS regime gaps, it is understandable to see that  e s  is larger with the 
LYS data than with the RR data. 
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
   
This paper provides an empirical analysis of the determination of de facto 
exchange rate regimes as well as their discrepancies with de jure exchange rate 
regimes in developing countries during the last two decades of the twentieth century. 
We use two different classifications of de facto exchange rate regimes: the Levy-
Yeyati-Sturzenegger classification based on a cluster analysis, and the Reinhart-
Rogoff classification based mainly on parallel market exchange rates. The de jure 
classification is made by the IMF based on official announcements. 
  Comparing de facto with de jure exchange rate regimes, we find that, while 
consistent regime combinations have the largest share (more than half but less than 
two-thirds), regime discrepancies in the form of fear of floating and fear of pegging 
are not uncommon. Both the regime itself, be it a de facto or a de jure regime, and the 
regime discrepancy tend to be persistent over time, although there is difference across 
regime classifications. When regimes do change, however, the concordance between 
de facto regime changes and de jure regime changes are weak.  
  Because the distributions of de facto and de jure exchange rate regimes are not 
independent with each other, we use a simultaneous equations model to explain the 
joint determination of the two regime choices, which allows explicitly for mutual 
dependence of the two. Since both regime choices are trichotomous ordered discrete 
variables, the simultaneity is assumed as concerning the respective latent variables, 
which measure the desired degree of flexibility of de facto and de jure regimes given 
macroeconomic situations. Due to the panel nature of our data, we include country-
specific, time-invariant random effects in the model, which can account for the 
correlation of regime choices. However, such correlation can also be caused by the 
direct influence of past regime choice on the current ones, so we also include 
dummies for past regime choices to account for state dependence in regime choices. 
The model is estimated using simulation-based maximum likelihood approach. 
  The results of the simultaneous equations model confirm our conjecture that the 
two regime choices are closely related and interdependent with each other. In general, 
de facto and de jure regimes tend to be consistent with each other. We detect both 
spurious state dependence, which is caused by unobservable country-specific random 
effects, and true state dependence, which is caused by the direct influence of past 
regime choices, in the determination of both de facto and de jure exchange rate 
regimes.    18 
  We also derive and estimate a random-effect panel ordered probit model to 
explain the causes of discrepancies between de facto and de jure regime choices. The 
results suggest that the error-correction mechanism is an important cause of regime 
gaps, since de facto regimes tend to deviate from de jure ones if the latter are viewed 
as overly flexible or rigid. Moreover, there are evidences showing that regime gaps 
tend to be persistent over time. Among those potential causes of regime discrepancies, 
larger economic size or higher inflation rates tend to make countries to exhibit fear of 
floating, as their de jure regimes are usually flexible ones, but their de facto regimes 
are often less flexible and their exchange rates tend to be quite stable. In contrast, 
countries with more advanced financial sector or maintaining intensive capital 
controls tend to show fear of pegging, i.e., their de facto regimes are more flexible 
than the de jure ones. The importance of other variables tends to be less robust to 
model specification and to the change in regime classification. 
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Appendix I.  Estimation Procedures 
 
A.I.1 Two-Stage Estimation of the Simultaneous Equations Model 
  In the first stage we estimate the reduced-form model. The reduced form of the 
structural model, (3a) and (3b), is as follows: 
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12 11 + + P + P =
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it it u e y ~ ~
22 21 + + P + P =
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i i e e e . The distribution of  i e ~  is i.i.d. N ) ~ , ( e S 0 , where the elements of  e S ~  
can be expressed as functions of the elements of  e S  as well as structural parameters 




it it u u u . Its distribution is normalized to be bivariate 
normal with unit variance on both dimensions and covariance parameter r . 
  The reduced-form equations can be estimated using a bivariate ordered probit 
model. Let the joint probability of choosing de facto regime  j  and de jure regime k  
by country i in year t be denoted by 
jk
it P , and its conditional counterpart conditioned 
on random effects de noted by  i
jk
it e P ~ | . That is,
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22 21 + P + P = x x . We use  2 F  to denote 
the joint distribution function for standard bivariate normal variables, and use F to 
denote its marginal distribution, then the conditional probabilities for various regime 
combinations are as follows: 
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14 Because the probabilities used in the paper always refer to those conditioned on explanatory 
variables, they are dropped out from the expressions for simplicity.   20 
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  The joint probability 
jk
it P not conditioned on  i e ~  can be viewed as an expectation 
of  i
jk
it e P ~ |  over all possible realizations of  i e ~ , which can then be approximated by the 




it e P ~ | , with 
r
i e ~ being a random draw from the distribution  given by 
i.i.d. N ) ~ , ( e S 0 , that is, 
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This is actually an application of the GHK simulator to panel probit model (for details 
see Train (2003)). With 
jk
it P being defined in such a way, we can formulate the 
likelihood function easily and estimate the reduced-form model using maximum 
likelihood estimation methods. 
  In the second stage, we estimate the structural model given by (3a) and (3b), but 
with the endogenous variables appearing on the right-hand side replaced with their 
instruments. We follow the approach adopted by Heckman (1978) to use fitted values 
of the endogenous variables, 
*
it q ˆ  and 
*
it y ˆ , as instruments. Let  , 2 , 1 , , ˆ = P n m mn  be the 








it it y x x . Note 
that we drop the random-effect terms to ensure that the instruments are not correlated 
with the random-effect terms included in the structural model. Now rewrite the 
structural model as follows: 
   
q
it it it u q q + =
* ,                  (A-3a) 
   
y
it it it u y y + =
* ,                  (A-3b) 
where 
q
i q it q
q
it it e y q + + =
*a b ˆ x  and 
y
i y it y
y
it it e q y + + =
*a b ˆ x . Because 
q
it u  and 
y
it u  are 
independent of each other (see (4b)), we have 






it e P e P e P
· · ´ = , 
where 
    ) | Pr( | and ) | Pr( | i it i
k
it i it i
j
it e k y e P e j q e P = = = =
· · . 
To be more specific,  
    ) ( 1 | ), | ( ) ( | ), ( |
2 0 1 0
it q i it i it it q i it it i it q t e P e P q t e P q e P - F - = - - F = - F =
· · · · , 
    ) ( 1 | ), | ( ) ( | ), ( |
2 0 1 0
it y i it i it it y i it it i it y t e P e P y t e P y e P - F - = - - F = - F =
· · · · . 
Finally, we apply the GHK simulator to approximate 
jk
it P using a formula similar to 
(A-2), with  i e  replacing  i e ~  and 
r
i e  being drawn from the distribution characterized by 
(4a). The full-sample log-likelihood function to be maximized is 
    { } ￿￿￿￿
= =
= = =
i t j k
jk





log and log 1 , 
where  {} 1  is an indicator function which takes a value of 1 if the statement in 
brackets is true and 0 otherwise. The estimable structural parameters include  q b ,  q a , 
q t ,  y b ,  y a ,  y t ,  qq s ,  qy s , and  yy s . 
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A.I.2 Estimation Procedures for the Ordered Probit Model 
  The expression for 
*
it g , equation (6), can be derived by subtracting (A-1a) from 
(A-1b) and by using the definition of 
*
it g : 












it it it it u u e e q y g - + - + P - P + P - P = - º
* * * x x  
                          it i it u e + + P = x ,            (A-4) 
where  it x  contains all distinct variables from 
q
it x  and 
y




i i e e e ~ ~ - =  is the composite country-specific random effect, which is i.i.d. N(
2 , 0 e s ), 




it it u u u ~ ~ - =  is i.i.d. N( ) 1 ( 2 , 0 r - ). Note that 
0 ) , | ( E = i it it e u x  by construction, and  ) | ( E ) , , | ( E it it it i it it y u y e u = x , which is typically 
not equal to zero. To see this point, note that 
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Using results from Maddala (1983, pp.365-366), it can be shown that 
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22 21 + P + P = x x  as before, and F (f ) denotes the distribution 
(density) function of standard normal variables. Obviously, these conditional means 
are unlikely to be zero. To obtain  ) | ~ ( E it
y
it y u , we apply the simulation technique, i.e., 
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i e ) ~ (  is a random draw based on the distribution i.i.d. N ) ~ , ( e S 0 . These are 
again non-zero in usual cases. Utilizing this result, we modify (A-4) in the following 
way: 
    it it
y
it i it it u y u e g + - + + P =
* ) | ~ ( E ) 1 ( r x ,          (A-6) 
where  ) | ~ ( E ) 1 ( it
y
it it it y u u u r - - =  with  0 ) | ( E = it it y u . By taking out of  it u  its non-
zero mean, the efficiency of the estimation can be improved.  
  If we define  ) | ~ ( E ) 1 ( it
y
it it it y u G r - + P = x  and normalize the variance of  it u  to 
be one, then we can use equation (5) to obtain 
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and the probabilities not conditioned on  i e  are simulated using 
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with 
r
i e  drawn from the distribution i.i.d. N(
2 , 0 e s ). Then we can formulate the 
likelihood function and use maximization procedures to estimate the model. 
 
 
Appendix II.  Definitions of Variables and Data Sources 
   
  CA: current account balances, normalized by GDP. Data source for current 
account balances and for GDP is the IMF, International Financial Statistics (IFS). 
  CPINF: transformed annual consumer price inflation rate (
* p ) using the 
formula  ) 1 /( p p p + =
* . Data source is the IMF, World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
database.  
  FINDEV: broad money (M2), normalized by GDP. Broad money is the sum of 
“money” and “quasi-money” taken from the IMF, IFS. 
  FISCAL: the ration of central government budget balances to GDP. Data source 
is the IMF, WEO database. 
  GEOCON: share of trade (exports plus imports) with the largest trading partner 
in total trade with the ten largest trading partners. Data source is the IMF, Direction of 
Trade Statistics (DOTS). 
  KCONTR: intensity of capital controls, defines as the sum of the dummies for 
(1) the existence of multiple or dual exchange rates, (2) the existence of restrictions on 
payments of current transactions, (3) the existence of restrictions on payments of 
capital transactions, and (4) the existence of surrender requirements for export 
proceeds. Data source is the IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions. 
  KFLOW: gross capital flows, normalized by GDP. Gross capital flows are the 
sum of inflows and outflows of direct investment, portfolio investment, and other 
investment. Data source for capital flows and for GDP is the IMF, IFS. 
  LAGFF: dummy variable, taking a value of one if fear of floating (i.e., the de 
jure regime being more flexible than the de facto regime) is observed in the last year, 
and zero otherwise. 
  LAGFP: dummy variable, taking a value of one if fear of pegging (i.e., the de 
jure regime being less flexible than the de facto regime) is observed in the last year, 
and zero otherwise. 
  LDFFLEX: dummy variable, taking a value of one if de facto exchange rate 
regime adopted in the last year is a flexible regime, and zero otherwise. 
  LDFINTER: dummy variable, taking a value of one if de facto exchange rate 
regime adopted in the last year is an intermediate regime, and zero otherwise. 
  LDJFLEX: dummy variable, taking a value of one if de jure exchange rate 
regime adopted in the last year is a flexible regime, and zero otherwise. 
    LDJINTER: dummy variable, taking a value of one if de jure exchange rate 
regime adopted in the last year is an intermediate regime, and zero otherwise. 
  LEVEL: per capita GDP in US dollars and then in logarithms. Data source is the 
IMF, WEO database. 
  NSHK: average absolute deviation of the annual growth rate of broad money 
around the four-year backward moving average. Data source for broad money growth 
rates is Ghosh et al. (2002). 
  OPENNESS: the ratio of the sum of exports and imports of goods and services 
to GDP. Data source is the IMF, WEO database.   23 
  PASSTHRU: correlation coefficient between monthly consumer price inflation 
rates and monthly rates of depreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) 
lagged by one month. The NEER is calculated vis-à-vis ten largest trading partners. 
Data source for inflation is the IMF, WEO database, for nominal exchange rate is the 
IMF, International Financial Statistics (IFS), for trade data is the IMF, DOTS. 
  RESERVE: non-gold international reserves, normalized by broad money. Data 
source for reserves and for broad money is the IMF, IFS. 
  RSHK: three-year centered standard deviation of the growth rate of terms of 
trade. Data source is Ghosh et al. (2002). 
  SIZE: gross domestic products in current prices, expressed in billions of US 
dollars and then in logarithms. Data source is the IMF, IFS. 
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Table 1 
Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes 
Fixed  Intermediate  Flexible 
De facto classification by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(0) inconclusive 
(1) fixed 
(2) intermediate   (3) float 
     
De facto classification by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(1) no separate legal 
tender 
(2) pre-announced peg 






(4) de facto peg 
(5) pre-announced crawling peg 
(6) pre-announced crawling band, 
bandwidth not exceeding ±2% 
(7) de facto crawling peg 
(8) de facto crawling band, 
bandwidth not exceeding ±2% 
(9) pre-announced crawling band, 
bandwidth exceeding ±2% 
(10) de facto crawling band, 
bandwidth not exceeding ±5% 
(11) moving band, bandwidth not 
exceeding ±2% 
(12) managed floating 
(13) freely floating 
(14) freely falling 
(15) hyperfloating 
     
De jure classification by the IMF (up to 1997) 
(1) single currency peg 
(2) SDR peg 
(3) other composite 
currency peg 
(4) flexibility vis-a-vis a single 
currency 
(5) flexibility vis-a-vis group of 
currencies 
(6) exchange rate adjusted 
according to indicators 




     
De jure classification by the IMF (since 1998) 
(1) no separate legal 
tender 
(2) currency board 
arrangement 
(3) other conventional 
fixed peg 
(4) horizontal band 
(5) crawling peg 
(6) crawling band 
(7) managed floating 
without pre-
announced path for 
exchange rates  
(8) independently 
floating 
Sources: Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000); Reinhart and Rogoff (2002); IMF, 
AREAER (various issues). 
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Table 2 
Cross-Classification of De Facto and De Jure Exchange Rate Regimes 
      LYS      RR   
Regimes  IMF  0  1  2  0  1  2 














               














               














               














               
Independence of Regime Distributions 
Chi-squared  122.36***  107.68*** 
               
Regime Discrepancies 
Fear of Pegging  175  [9.7]  369  [20.4] 
Consistent   1160  [64.3]  1009  [55.9] 
Fear of Floating  470  [26.0]  427  [23.7] 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are percentage shares of row sums reported under the 
column head “IMF”. Numbers in brackets are percentage shares of total number of 




Regime Persistence and Persistence of Regime Gaps 
  IMF  LYS  RR 
  Obs.  Share (%)  Obs.  Share (%)  Obs.  Share (%) 
Regime Persistence 
Fixed   941  94.0  920  85.8  695  95.7 
Intermediate  95  81.9  183  46.9  513  91.4 
Flexible  636  92.4  199  58.0  465  89.8 
Average  -  92.6  -  72.1  -  92.7 
             
Persistence of Regime Gaps between IMF and LYS or RR Classifications 
Fear of Pegging  97  53.3  331  84.0 
Consistent  964  83.1  912  91.8 
Fear of Floating  318  68.7  365  87.5 
Average  -  76.4  -  89.1 
Note: Regime persistence is measured by the conditional probability of adopting an 
exchange rate regime in the current year given that the same regime was adopted in 
the last year. Gap persistence is defined analogously. Average persistence is the 
weighted average of the persistence of three regimes. 
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Table 4 
Regime Flexibility in This Year Compared with Last Year 
Regime      LYS      RR   
Flexibility  IMF  (-)  (0)  (+)  (-)  (0)  (+) 














               














               














               














       
Average  -  (71.6)  (87.7) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are percentage shares of row sums reported under the 
column head “IMF”. Numbers in brackets are percentage shares of total number of 
observations (1805). Average association is the weighted average of the three 
diagonal elements.  
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Table 5 
Simultaneous Equations Model for the Joint Determination of De facto and De jure 
Exchange Rate Regimes 
  LYS  RR  LYS  RR 
Variables  Coeff.  S. E.  Coeff.  S. E.  Coeff.  S. E.  Coeff.  S. E. 
De facto Exchange Rate Regime 
*
it y   0.72**  0.07  0.27**  0.09  0.36**  0.06  0.02  0.04 
CPINF  0.47  0.30  6.68**  1.74  0.55  0.43  -0.14  0.42 
PASSTHRU  -0.26  0.16  -0.68*  0.41  -0.24  0.25  -0.09  0.17 
CA  0.46  0.79  4.57**  2.07  0.73  0.73  -0.28  0.49 
FISCAL  -1.16  0.97  -3.87  2.49  -2.37*  1.30  0.01  0.03 
KFLOW  -1.17**  0.41  -0.50  0.43  -1.35**  0.57  -0.18  0.21 
LDFINTER          1.14**  0.20  3.04**  0.19 
LDFFLEX          2.04**  0.27  5.50**  0.29 
q t     1.01**  0.06  3.41**  0.98  1.45**  0.18  2.83**  0.14 
De jure Exchange Rate Regime 
*
it q   0.61**  0.17  0.42**  0.10  0.20**  0.08  0.18**  0.04 
OPENNESS  0.45**  0.12  0.24  0.21  0.24*  0.14  0.12  0.16 
GEOCON  0.74  0.60  1.03**  0.46  0.04  0.51  0.13  0.25 
SIZE  0.48**  0.10  0.33**  0.06  0.11**  0.04  0.08**  0.04 
LEVEL  -0.34**  0.10  -0.29**  0.10  -0.08  0.13  -0.02  0.05 
FINDEV  -1.09**  0.41  -1.46**  0.40  -0.19  0.27  -0.38*  0.22 
RSHK  0.97  0.67  -0.52  0.60  1.07  0.80  0.51  0.50 
NSHK  0.58  1.66  -3.46**  1.22  -0.36  5.77  -1.46  0.94 
RESERVE  -0.05  0.37  -0.28  0.54  -0.21  0.39  -0.16  0.27 
KCONTR  -0.25**  0.09  -0.31**  0.10  -0.03  0.04  -0.02  0.04 
LDJINTER          1.55**  0.22  1.56**  0.18 
LDJFLEX          3.28**  0.23  3.35**  0.20 
y t   0.50**  0.10  0.37**  0.05  0.71**  0.07  0.64**  0.07 
Variance-Covariance Matrix of Country-Specific Random Effects 
qq s   0.68**  0.20  7.00  4.72  1.04**  0.50  0.30**  0.10 
qy s   1.35**  0.27  1.81**  0.72  0.47**  0.14  0.24**  0.08 
yy s   2.70**  1.37  1.29**  0.46  0.21**  0.09  0.20*  0.10 
Memorandum Items 
Observations  1315  1336  1280  1335 











Correct (%)                 
   De facto  56.1  51.9  67.7  91.5 
   De jure  63.3  66.0  90.5  91.8 
   Joint  41.1  33.6  62.8  84.6 
Note: All specifications are estimated with a constant and period dummies included in 
both regime equations. Significance at 10% and 5% level is indicated by * and ** 
respectively.   28 
Table 6 
Ordered Probit Model for Regime Discrepancies 
  LYS  RR  LYS  RR 
Variables  Coeff.  S. E.  Coeff.  S. E.  Coeff.  S. E.  Coeff.  S. E. 
) | ~ ( E it
y
it y u   1.94**  0.21  3.39**  0.86  1.49**  0.17  1.88**  0.14 
OPENNESS  0.38**  0.10  0.77**  0.30  0.22**  0.09  0.22  0.19 
GEOCON  0.83**  0.36  0.52  0.57  0.39  0.32  0.03  0.16 
SIZE  0.18**  0.04  0.36**  0.09  0.10**  0.03  0.00  0.04 
LEVEL  -0.25**  0.06  -0.15  0.10  -0.10*  0.05  -0.08  0.07 
FINDEV  -0.21**  0.06  -3.74**  1.00  -0.12**  0.05  -0.51*  0.29 
RSHK  0.29  0.29  -1.15**  0.47  0.16  0.38  -0.12  0.40 
NSHK  0.61  0.83  -5.69**  1.91  0.00  0.07  -2.19**  1.00 
RESERVE  -0.36  0.24  -0.70  0.43  -0.09  0.20  0.08  0.31 
KCONTR  -0.27**  0.05  -0.55**  0.16  -0.11**  0.04  -0.05  0.05 
CPINF  1.19**  0.35  -1.65**  0.56  0.69**  0.29  1.08**  0.33 
PASSTHRU  0.23  0.18  0.07  0.18  0.10  0.19  -0.13  0.19 
CA  0.61  0.67  -0.99  0.99  -0.44  0.62  0.85  0.75 
FISCAL  1.88*  1.09  -1.71  1.42  1.46  1.07  -0.52  1.14 
KFLOW  0.15  0.11  -0.47  0.32  0.05  0.12  -0.02  0.18 
LAGFP          -1.71**  0.22  -3.31**  0.23 
LAGFF          1.55**  0.18  2.99**  0.22 
g t   3.89**  0.42  5.55**  1.41  3.26**  0.34  3.96**  0.26 
Variance of Country-Specific Random Effects 
e s   0.90**  0.22  1.80**  0.62  0.52**  0.24  0.26  0.24 
Memorandum Items 
Observations  1315  1336  1280  1335 











Correct (%)  68.8  67.7  77.2  92.4 
Note: All specifications are estimated with a constant and period dummies. 
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